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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 




DANIEL ALLEN BROWN, 
 












          NO. 43262 
 
          Canyon County Case No.  
          CR-2012-10660 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Brown failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
relinquishing jurisdiction and executing his underlying unified sentence of five years, 
with one and one-half years fixed, imposed upon his guilty plea to burglary? 
 
 
Brown Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
 Brown pled guilty to burglary and the district court imposed a suspended unified 
sentence of five years, with one and one-half years fixed, and placed Brown on 
probation for three years.  (R., pp.36-38.)   Fifty-four days later, Brown incurred new 
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criminal charges and was required to serve a total of 21 days of discretionary jail time.  
(R., pp.39-40.)   Just over two months later, Brown was required to serve an additional 
seven days of discretionary jail time for violating a No Contact Order.  (R., p.41.)  The 
state subsequently filed a Petition for Probation Violation alleging Brown had violated 
his probation by committing new crimes.  (R., pp.42-53.)  Brown admitted to violating his 
probation and the district court revoked his probation and reinstated him on probation 
for three years beginning May 20, 2013.  (R., p.68.) 
 On December 31, 2013, Brown was required to serve seven days of 
discretionary jail time for another No Contact Order violation, and for incurring the new 
charge of driving without privileges.  (R., p.69.)  Less than seven months later, the state 
filed a new Petition for Probation Violation alleging Brown had again violated his 
probation.  (R., pp.70-77.)  Brown admitted to some of the allegations in the Petition, 
and the district court again revoked and reinstated him on probation for 18 months 
beginning on November 12, 2014.  (R., p.93.)   
On November 24, 2014, Brown was again ordered to serve seven days of 
discretionary jail time, and the state filed a third Petition for Probation Violation on 
December 2, 2014.  (R., pp.94-99.)  After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found 
Brown in violation of his probation, revoked probation, ordered Brown’s underlying 
sentence executed, and retained jurisdiction for 365 days.  (R., pp.114-15.) 
 After a period of retained jurisdiction, the district court relinquished jurisdiction 
without a hearing and ordered Brown’s sentence executed without reduction.  (R., 
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pp.116-17.)   Brown timely appealed and timely filed a Rule 35 motion for sentence 
reduction, which the district court denied.  (R., pp.118-26, 133-37.1) 
Brown asserts the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished 
jurisdiction “[i]n light of his expressed desire to be successful and his positive actions on 
the rider.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.4.)  The record supports the district court’s decision to 
relinquish jurisdiction.   
“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.”  I.C. § 19-2601(4). 
 The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.  See 
State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 
205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990).   A court’s decision to relinquish 
jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient 
information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be 
inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.  State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 
584 (Ct. App. 1984). 
Contrary to Brown’s claim on appeal, Brown has not shown he is an appropriate 
candidate for probation.  While in the community, Brown repeatedly committed new 
crimes and generally disregarded the directions of his probation officer and the terms of 
his probation.  (R., pp.39-53, 69-77, 94-99.)  While on his Rider at NICI, Brown 
repeatedly lied to staff; deliberately disobeyed the rules of his program; disobeyed direct 
orders given to him by NICI staff; failed to complete any of his programming; and failed 
                                            
 
1 Brown is not challenging the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion on 
appeal.  (Appellant’s brief, p.3.) 
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to take responsibility for his underlying crime in this matter, stating he had only “taken 
the fall for his wife.”  (05/07/15 APSI, pp.1-4 (Augmentation).)  In recommending the 
district court relinquish jurisdiction, NICI staff stated: 
 
Mr. Brown has failed to make responsible choices while at NICI.  He 
appears to be focused on criminal activities rather than changing his 
thinking and behavior so that he can be successful on probation.  In April, 
he was asked how he believed he was doing, and he reported, “I honestly 
think that I am off to a good start and am learning something every day.”  
Either he was not being honest, which has been an ongoing issue with Mr. 
Brown, or he is unaware of the reality of his situation.  While at NICI, Mr. 
Brown has continued to use the criminal and addictive patterns and 
distortions that terminated his probation in the first place.  Currently, he 
appears deeply reliant on his ability to manipulate others in order to avoid 
negative consequences.  This is a maladaptive coping skill; however, he 
does not appear motivated to change at this time.  During his end-case 
interview, Mr. Brown reported that he understood that his probation officer 
was only trying to help him, yet he also blamed him when he reported that 
he would be fine with a new probation officer.  Currently, Mr. Brown is 
either unwilling or unable to make the necessary changes in order to be 
successful on probation and does not appear suitable for release to the 
community at this time. 
 
(05/07/15 APSI, p.6.)  Brown has failed to demonstrate that he was a viable candidate 
for community supervision, particularly in light of his abysmal performance both on 
probation and during the short time he was in the retained jurisdiction program, and his 
failure to demonstrate any rehabilitative progress.  Given any reasonable view of the 
facts, Brown has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Brown’s conviction and 
sentence.       
 DATED this 16th day of December, 2015. 
 
 
       /s/     
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      CATHERINE MINYARD 
      Paralegal 
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